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Key Points 
Trade negotiations involving international public procurement rules are on the rise, stimulating 
a growing interest in having a clear picture of the economic stakes involved, including the current 
level of international openness. A recent paper published by the European Centre for International 
Political Economy (Messerlin, 2016) made an attempt to provide a range of estimates for the EU 
and the US and found relatively low rates of import penetration. This analytical approach, 
however, looked only at the ‘tip of the procurement iceberg’, as the data used covered primarily 
only one modality of international procurement (direct cross-border), which is not the main avenue 
for international government procurement. Other modalities, such as procurement from foreign 
subsidiaries established in Europe, account for much more. Such an approach therefore ignores the 
main modalities through which foreign firms win EU contracts. Once these other main 
procurement modalities are taken into account, EU openness in procurement is much higher. 
Comparable data across all modalities do not yet exist for the US, but we do have clear evidence 
that the US has introduced the largest number of protectionist procurement measures since 2008 
affecting all modalities for international procurement.  
Against this background, this Policy Brief makes four basic points: 
i. Public procurement is a key area of trade negotiations, and TTIP is no exception to this 
rule. 
ii. The existing levels of openness in procurement markets need to be assessed across all three 
main procurement modalities and not based only on direct cross-border procurement, 
which is not the main procurement avenue. According to this comprehensive metric, the 
EU market already has a high foreign participation rate, including by US companies.  
iii. Unfortunately, similar data do not exist for the US market. But there is growing evidence 
of discriminatory measures introduced in recent years, which impede the ability of EU 
firms to compete on a level-playing field in US procurement markets. 
iv. The importance of procurement as a key negotiating area requires better data and a greater 
analytical engagement.  
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Public procurement: A key policy area 
in international negotiations 
Public procurement is a negotiating area that is 
gaining in importance at multilateral and 
bilateral level, as evidenced by the growing 
number of procurement provisions in existing 
and future trade agreements. The importance of 
negotiations over public procurement stems from 
the size of procurement spending, which in most 
developed economies is in double-digit 
percentage points of GDP, and the fact that 
procurement has traditionally been subject to 
discriminatory policies in many jurisdictions. 
TTIP is no exception to this trend as public 
procurement is considered an important 
negotiating priority by both parties, given the 
considerable potential for economic gains and 
greater efficiency that can be achieved by further 
liberalising public procurement.  
Despite the size and importance of this 
agreement, however, the factual information 
available to trade negotiators remains scarce. 
Although public procurement patterns (e.g. size 
of procurement markets, composition of 
procurement spending and level of government 
procurement) can be derived from traditional 
national accounts statistics, these figures fall 
short of capturing the international dimension of 
public procurement. Therefore, there is a clear 
need to provide further analytical evidence on 
the structure of international public procurement 
in the EU and the US.  
A recent paper by Messerlin (2016) tried to shed 
light on some critical issues in the TTIP 
negotiations on public procurement. One 
important yardstick used in the paper is an 
indicator aimed at measuring the current level of 
openness in public procurement in the EU and 
the US, by comparing the share of imports in total 
demand for public goods and services in the EU 
and the US, based on WIOD input-output data. 
Starting from this proposed de facto openness 
metric, Messerlin (2016) argues that, the United 
States and the EU (on average across its member 
states) have similar levels of foreign penetration 
ratios in total public procurement markets, 
somewhere around 4%. This indicator is then 
seen as clear evidence that there is little, if any, 
imbalance in the current level of openness.  
While this assessment offers some interesting 
insights, it suffers from a number of serious 
shortcomings that could misguide current policy 
debates, if misinterpreted. Simply put, these 
import penetration rates overlook a number of 
important elements and as such represent only 
the ‘tip of the procurement iceberg’. 
What lies beyond the tip of the 
procurement iceberg? 
One key element that needs to be borne in 
mind when looking at international 
procurement is that foreign firms can win 
public contracts in a variety of ways. Cernat 
& Kutlina-Dimitrova (2015) summarised 
these options into three modalities of 
international procurement, a concept similar 
to the terminology employed in the General 
Agreement for Trade in Services (GATS) for 
trade in services: 
 Modality 1 - direct cross-border 
international procurement: a foreign 
company submitting a bid and winning a 
public contract ‘from abroad’. 
 Modality 2 - commercial presence 
procurement: a domestic subsidiary of a 
foreign company wins ‘locally’ the public 
contract. 
 Modality 3 - Value-added indirect 
international procurement: a foreign 
company participates indirectly with 
parts and components (goods and 
services) without necessarily being part of 
the winning bid. In this case the foreign 
company may supply goods and services 
to a domestic company winning the bid or 
to another foreign company that receives 
the public contract. 
Out of these three modalities of international 
public procurement, Messerlin (2016) captures 
only modality 1. However, previous empirical 
work (notably the Ramboll, 2011, study cited by 
Messerlin & Miroudot, 2012, as well) provides 
evidence that in fact the most important vehicle 
for international procurement is modality 2, 
followed by modality 3, while modality 1 is a 
distant third in terms of economic importance. 
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The intuition behind this finding is clear: for a 
large number of products and services purchased 
by public authorities, proximity is key. Hence, 
the existing data seem to suggest that distance 
matters in public procurement and very often 
goods and services are procured from companies 
(foreign and domestic) that are located in the 
proximity of the procuring authorities.  
Therefore, inferring overall procurement 
openness from modality 1 data alone puts a 
serious caveat on the main finding in Messerlin 
(2016) with regard to the level of ‘de facto’ 
openness in both the EU and the US. In addition, 
this indicator fails to capture the government 
investment1 component of public procurement, 
which is a major element in public procurement 
spending. The reason for that lies in the structure 
of the underlying input-output tables. This 
framework based on supply and use tables 
reflects commodities demand for intermediate 
and final uses. The latter consist of private-
household consumption, government 
consumption and investment. The demand for 
investment goods, however, is not split into 
government and public investment, and hence, 
the government investment dimension is missing 
in the input-output framework. National 
accounts statistics for the EU and the US, 
however, reveal that government investment in 
total procurement is quite important, standing at 
17% and 34% in 2012, respectively (Cernat & 
Kutlina-Dimitrova, 2015). Hence, one should also 
take into account international procurement 
related to government investment.  
Another important drawback of the Messerlin 
(2016) indicator is the fact that public 
procurement as measured in the input-output 
tables framework based on national accounts 
includes the so-called below-threshold procurement 
(low-value contracts that are not legally subject to 
international procurement rules). This is 
obviously of great significance as there is 
evidence that the value of a procurement contract 
has a positive influence on the probability of a 
foreign company winning a bid (Kutlina-
                                                   
1 The government investment component of public 
procurement, i.e. the aggregate gross fixed capital 
formation, refers to infrastructure expenditures, for 
example, building new roads. See also OECD (2015). 
Dimitrova & Lakatos, 2014). This finding is also 
linked to the fact that foreign companies are more 
likely to bid for large-value contracts, as in 
general they are facing higher foreign-market 
entry/penetration costs. Accordingly, an 
asymmetry bias is likely to be present with 
respect to foreign-penetration shares below and 
above threshold procurement. In light of this 
bias, the import penetration ratios used by 
Messerlin (2016) are not a good metric for 
assessing the openness of public procurement 
subject to international treaties. Last but not least, 
Messerlin’s analysis does not capture import-
penetration ratios for public utility providers,2 
despite the fact that public procurement of utility 
services represents a sizable share of public 
procurement in the EU. In fact, such services 
have higher import penetration shares for 
modality 1 compared to other procurement 
contracts (Kutlina-Dimitrova & Lakatos, 2014). 
To sum up, an analysis of procurement openness 
substantiated merely through input-output data 
as attempted by Messerlin is at best partial and at 
worst fails to provide a realistic picture of the 
actual situation.  
Instead, more accurate evidence on the size of 
modality 1 (cross-border public procurement) in 
the EU and the US is provided by contract award 
data. The Ramboll (2011) study, for instance, 
finds modality 1 penetration rates for the EU at 
3.5% for the 2007-09 period (with smaller EU 
member states having higher import shares). 
These estimates are in line with the results of 
more recent analysis based on an extended 
dataset (2008-12) by Kutlina-Dimitrova & 
Lakatos (2014), where it is found that the direct 
cross-border share for modality 1 in Europe stood 
at 3.7% for that period. For the US procurement 
market, Fronk (2015) finds modality 1 import 
penetration ratios lower than 2% prior to 2006 
and between 3.6-4.1% for subsequent years (2006-
10) (based on detailed US federal contract award 
data).  
It should be pointed out, however, that these 
modality 1 import penetration rates of the EU 
2 Public utility companies provide electricity, natural 
gas, water or sewage services. 
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and the US procurement are not directly 
comparable. The US estimates are based on a 
dataset that capture only US procurement at the 
federal level, whereas the EU figures cover both 
national and sub-national procurement. 
Knowing that US sub-federal procurement is less 
subject to international commitments, it is very 
likely that the overall (federal and sub-federal) 
modality 1 import-penetration ratio for the US is 
lower than the federal level estimated by Fronk 
(2015).   
But as indicated, modality 1 is only the tip of the 
international procurement iceberg. When 
looking at modality 2 (procurement via foreign 
affiliates), we get a different picture in terms of 
levels of openness in EU member states. The 
Ramboll (2011) study finds that 13.4% of the EU 
public procurement market is awarded to foreign 
affiliates from non-EU countries. Strikingly, US 
foreign affiliates have obtained one-quarter of the 
extra-EU foreign penetration rate, the largest 
share of any EU trading partner. Unfortunately, 
there are no available modality 2 estimates for the 
share of EU foreign affiliates in the US 
procurement market. 
Under modality 3 (value-added procurement), 
foreign firms may obtain indirectly a share of 
public spending even when they are not part of 
the winning bid (as subcontractors or arms-
length suppliers). The Ramboll (2011) study 
assessed the share of indirect procurement 
through such contractual relations to be around 
12% of the total EU procurement market. Again, 
there are no estimates for modality 3 foreign 
penetration rates in the US procurement market, 
which hampers any comparison in this respect. It 
is important to note, however, that ‘Buy 
American’ provisions limit the possibility of 
firms winning public contracts to source certain 
inputs from abroad. Thus, whenever such ‘buy-
local’ provisions induce a costly change in the 
production patterns of potential foreign bidders, 
they will not only impose restrictions on 
modality 3 international procurement but also 
indirectly on modalities 1 and 2. Therefore, such 
restrictions may discourage entrance or reduce 
the ability to win public contracts for both foreign 
firms and US affiliates, if they have to source 
intermediate inputs in sub-optimal ways due to 
‘buy-local’ provisions. 
Since data on modality 2 and 3 do not exist for the 
US procurement market, we cannot at this stage 
make a proper comparison of the overall level of 
de facto openness of the EU and the US 
procurement markets. Without speculating 
about the likely magnitude of de facto US 
openness in these public procurement 
modalities, one is left only with evidence on de 
jure openness, based on protectionist measures 
found in the US that may negatively affect such 
international procurement. The scope and 
discriminatory nature of local content 
requirements under ‘buy-local’ provisions is 
already well-known and documented in Luckey 
(2012), for instance. Some of these measures have 
a clear negative impact on modality 3 
procurement and one would expect such 
measures to negatively affect the ability of both 
US companies and foreign affiliates to source 
certain inputs from abroad. Overall, such 
discriminatory measures (with various degrees 
of domestic preferential treatment) tend to 
reduce the ability of foreign firms across all three 
procurement modalities to win public contracts 
in the United States, notably at the sub-federal 
level. 
Recent trends in public procurement 
policies and their discriminatory nature 
Clear evidence of the impediments to 
international procurement in the US market can 
also be derived from the data provided by the 
Global Trade Alerts (GTA) project. Coordinated 
by the Centre for Economic Policy Research, the 
project tracks newly introduced protectionist 
measures around the world, including in the field 
of public procurement. 
Several GTA reports contain detailed 
information about new policy measures affecting 
international procurement introduced by a large 
number of jurisdictions and their discriminatory 
level. Figure 1 provides an overview of the 
annual frequency of newly introduced state 
measures in the field of public procurement, 
which would possibly have a discriminatory 
effect against foreign goods and services or 
foreign suppliers.  
Since the database’s creation in the second half of 
2008 until the end of 2014, there have been 195 
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measures in the field of international public 
procurement worldwide. Out of these, 129 have 
been described as almost certainly 
discriminatory (red), 57 as measures that are 
likely to discriminate (amber) and 9 as non-
discriminatory measures. Analysing the data on 
newly introduced measures depicted in Figure 1 
reveals an interesting ‘U-shaped’ trend: the initial 
downward trend in newly introduced 
protectionist measures in the 2009-12 period is 
significantly reversed in 2013 and 2014 leading to 
an expansion of newly introduced protectionist 
measures. Between 2012 and 2014 the newly 
introduced protectionist (red) measures 
increased from 2 to 66. The same trend applies to 
the ‘amber’ measures which increased from 2 to 
17.     
 
Figure 1. Newly introduced public procurement measures by level of restrictiveness at global level, count 
of measures, 2009-14 
 
Legend: Red: almost certainly discriminatory measures. Amber: measures likely to discriminate. Green: non-discriminatory 
measures.  
Source: GTA database.  
This shows that protectionist measures in the 
field of international procurement have gained 
substantially in importance. The trend described 
above refers to the whole sample of countries 
included in the database of the GTA report. It is 
undoubtedly interesting to see that some 
governments have resorted to protectionist 
measures in cross-border procurement more 
often than others, between 2009 and 2014. 
According to the GTA data collected across all 
major trading partners, the US has introduced the 
largest number of new discriminatory measures 
in the field of public procurement (GTA 2015). 
The discriminatory measures seem to apply 
particularly to metal products, construction 
works but also to foodstuffs and other important 
intermediate products (textiles, chemicals, etc.). 
It is also noteworthy that this protectionist 
tendency is visible in other key EU trading 
partners, with several EU member states being 
among the most-affected countries by such 
protectionist measures, in the US and elsewhere. 
For instance, German and French goods and 
services were subject to around 50 new 
discriminatory measures in the field of 
government procurement around the world. In 
general, EU firms have frequently been subject to 
protectionist measures in the field of 
procurement: out of the top 20 most-affected 
countries by global protectionist measures in the 
GTA database, 13 are EU member states.  
Public procurement: What role for new 
trade negotiations? 
The various elements presented above point out 
three important facts. First, whether measured on 
a de facto or de jure basis, international openness 
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in public procurement is a powerful element for 
economic gains, as part of a globalised economy. 
Second, in the case of the TTIP negotiations, there 
is clear evidence that the current level of EU 
openness is higher than the ‘tip of the iceberg 
when looking at all three procurement 
modalities. While the overall US openness 
remains unknown, there is convincing evidence 
that major gains can be reaped from TTIP 
negotiations, across all modalities of supply, and 
in particular in those areas where discriminatory 
measures have been identified. Third, it would be 
wrong to think that additional gains cannot be 
reaped by US firms in the EU market as a result 
of new procurement rules in the future TTIP 
agreement.  
As Messerlin (2016) pointed out, trade 
negotiations can go hand-in-hand with domestic 
regulatory reforms and can mutually reinforce 
future measures in the EU and the US aimed at 
more open and efficient procurement markets. 
There is also clearly the need for better data on 
the international dimension of public 
procurement. The absence of a comprehensive, 
comparable global database on international 
procurement clearly presents a main challenge 
for the current and upcoming trade negotiations 
on procurement, including TTIP. There are 
encouraging developments from international 
organisations, however, that new data on 
international public procurement will soon 
become available. 
In conclusion, against the recent slowdown in 
global trade and the worrying trend towards 
protectionist measures, TTIP and other new trade 
agreements are poised to play a critical role in 
ensuring a level playing field for all companies in 
the area of procurement, which accounts for a 
large share of GDP both in Europe and in the US.  
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